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Impersonal Intentions 
Abstract: Matthew Babb offers a strikingly elegant argument for, and explanation 
of, the essential indexicality of intentional argument. His two key thoughts are 
that intentional action always involves intentions, and intentions are essentially 
indexical. In particular, every intention is indexically about the agent whose intention it 
is, i.e. de se. In this paper, I set out two models on which at least some intentions 
are not de se Ð they are impersonal Ð and I show that these models are compatible 
with the data Babb points to. I also set out some more data that an account of 
essential indexical cases ought to be responsive to. Its span suggests that the 
claim that all intentions are de se, even if true, cannot be what explains what is 
going on in essential indexical cases involving intention.  
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Mathtew Babb (2016) offers the following strikingly simple argument for, and 
explanation of, the essential indexicality of intentional action and agency:  
 
1. Intentions are essential to intentional actions and agency.  
2. Intentions are essentially indexical  
3. Therefore, intentional action and agency are essentially indexical (2016:447).  
 
There are probably readings of ÔintentionalÕ on which 1 is false. For example, one might 
say that an action is intentional if and only if is directed by the whole agent as opposed to 
some subsystem of the agent. On this reading, spiders are intentional agents despite not 
having any intentions. But it is also very natural to think that there are other readings on 
which 1 is true and, indeed, truistic. Babb comments regarding 1: ÔThat intentional action 
requires having intentions is as close to a truism as one can getÕ (2016: 448). I wonÕt 
query 1. 
 
BabbÕs reason for accepting 2 is that he thinks that any intention will be indexically about 
the agent whose intention it is. Of course, there are other ways in which an intention might be 
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indexical Ð e.g. by being indexically about a time, or a place. But the case Babb makes for 
2 does depend on just one specific kind of indexicality. To keep this in view, IÕll talk of 
intentions, as Babb is thinking of them, as being de se, rather than just indexical. 2 is 
supposed to be is true because all intentions are de se Ð i.e. indexically about the agent.  
 
What considerations does Babb offer for the claim that all intentions are de se? One 
consideration is that the idea of one agent making another agentÕs decisions for them is incoherent. 
Another consideration Ð independent, it seems to me Ð is that agents are capable of resolving 
cases of conflicting intention. IÕll provide two models of intentions on which at least some 
intentions are not de se Ð they are impersonal. On the first impersonal model, some 
intentions are not about the agent at all. On the second impersonal model, some intentions 
are about the agent without being de se. ItÕs an open question whether either of these 
models is correct. But IÕll show that neither of them has a problem with either of the two 
considerations Babb points to. In section I, I set out BabbÕs point about the impossibility 
of deciding for someone else, and introduce the two non-de se models of intention. In 
section II, I consider BabbÕs argument from conflicting intentions. In concluding, I set 
out some data that I think an account of essential indexical cases ought to be responsive 
to. The span of the data suggests that the claim that all intentions are de se, even if true, 
cannot be what explains what is going on in essential indexical cases involving intention.   
 
Section I: The impossibility of making anotherÕs decisions for them.  
 
Very often we ascribe intentions in a way that makes it clear that they are about the agent 
who has the intention. E.g. ÔI intend that I go runningÕ, ÔI intend to go runningÕ. ÔYou 
intend that you go runningÕ. In all these cases, the embedded clauses have subject terms 
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(an unvoiced one Ð PRO Ð in the case of ÔI intend to go runningÕ) that co-refer with the 
subjects of the main clause.  
 
We donÕt always speak that way. We also say things like: ÔJill intends that Jack go runningÕ 
or ÔJill intends Jack to go runningÕ. But, in every such case, BabbÕs thought is, we need to 
supply some unarticulated material. Once this material is supplied it will be clear that the 
intention ascribed really is about Jill.  We need to understand the claim to be: ÔJill intends 
that she see to it that Jack goes runningÕ or ÔJill intends to see to it that Jack goes 
runningÕ.  
 
What if someone resisted that and said that, on the reading they have in mind, JillÕs 
intention really is just about Jack and his running, not about Jill at all? The problem, 
Babb says, is that such a reading would: 
 
É imply one person has direct authority over someone elseÕs agency, which is 
incomprehensible. For example, (4c) [ÔJill intends Jack to go runningÕ] implies [if 
read in this unsupplemented way Ð author] that Jill has direct authority over not 
just JackÕs actions, but over his agency as well. By ÔdirectÕ authority, what is meant 
is not that Jill can cause Jack to do certain things. What is meant is Jill literally 
makes JackÕs decisions. She is not merely making his decisions for him; she is 
making his decisions full stopÉ.In order for Jill to make JackÕs decisions full stop 
Jill would have to be Jack. That however is beyond the reach of possibility. 
(2016:451)   
 
I think this point about its being impossible for one agent to make anotherÕs decisions is 
correct, and very insightful. But I also suspect that it is a bit of a red herring in this 
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context. Notice first that there are plenty of sentences that ascribe intentions that arenÕt 
obviously about the agent whose intention it is, but to which no oneÕs elseÕs agency is 
relevant. Here are four:  
 
 ÔJill intends that Jack be shot in the backÕ.  
 
 ÔJill intends that AyerÕs rock cease to exist.Õ   
  
 ÔJill intends that the tea be in the cup.Õ  
 
 ÔJill intends that someone raise their hand.Õ 
 
One might, and Babb presumably does, regard these sentences as not making sense 
without supplementation. E.g. one might think that the first and the second have to be 
understood as ascribing to Jill, respectively, the intention that she see to it that Jack be 
shot in the back, and the intention that she see to it that AyerÕs rock cease to exist. But 
the reason that the four sentences do not make sense without supplementation (if they 
donÕt) cannot be that the unsupplemented readings imply that Jill has direct authority 
over someone elseÕs agency. In the case of the first sentence, there is a second agent on 
the scene Ð Jack Ð but the predicate chosen (Ôbe shot in the backÕ) makes it clear that his 
agency is not in question. In the other three cases, there is no second agent. Relatedly, 
someone who insists that these four sentences do make sense unsupplemented is in no 
way committed to the claim that, sometimes, one agent makes another agentÕs decision.  
 
IÕm going to describe two models of how some intentions could fail to be de se. On the 
first, the relevant intentions are not about the agent at all Ð they are worldly (so, on this 
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sense, the unsupplemented readings of sentences like ÔJill intends that AyerÕs rock cease 
to exist.Õ do make sense). On the second, the relevant intentions are about the agent but 
not in a de se way. IÕll be emphasizing how neither model has a problem with the point 
that nobody can make anybody elseÕs decisions for them. 1   
 
The worldly intentions model  
 
Here is a self-directed-intention free explanation of JillÕs intentionally seeing to it that 
AyerÕs rock ceases to exist. Jill formed the worldly intention that AyerÕs rock cease to 
exist. This did not cause her to start deliberating about appropriate means to that end. In 
particular, it did not lead her to form an intention to the effect that she press a button that 
sends a missile flying towards AyerÕs rock.  But, of course, Jill had to do something with 
her body to act on AyerÕs rock. Some means had to be selected. And the particular 
means selected was the pressing of the button. This selection of means was achieved 
subpersonally, rather than via the formation of a self-directed intention. As is very 
familiar, one sometimes intentionally moves oneÕs arm by twitching certain muscles 
without the twitching of the muscleÕs being something one intends. Similarly, the thought 
is, Jill has intentionally seen to it that AyerÕs rock ceases to exist by pressing a button that 
sends a missile flying towards AyerÕs rock. But she didnÕt form the intention that she 
press the button, or that she send the missile flying, or even that she see to it that AyerÕs 
rock ceases to exist. The only intention she formed is the worldly intention that AyerÕs 
rock cease to exist.   
 
                                                        
1 I make no claim for originality in relation to these models. Both of them are present in Cappelen and 
Dever (2013). The first is also present in Magidor (2015). The second is also present in Millikan (1990), 
(2001).  
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I doubt that this explanation would be the correct one for most realistic instances of a 
human agent intentionally seeing to it that AyerÕs rock ceases to exist. In imagining a 
realistic case of a human agent doing that, one naturally imagines the agent as being able 
to say something authoritative about the means they are employing (e.g. ÔI am pressing 
this buttonÕ). But they wouldnÕt be in a position to say that, if pressing the button had 
just been selected by their subpersonal systems.   
 
Perhaps this isnÕt just a point about human agency. Perhaps there are in principle limits on 
what kind of thing can be outsourced to the subpersonal level which means that the idea 
of an intentional agent (a God, say) simply forming a worldly intention and then 
executing it without forming any self-directed intention about appropriate means is 
subtly incoherent. But, to make that credible, one needs to give some account of the 
source of the incoherence. BabbÕs point about the impossibility of making someone elseÕs 
decisions for them is compelling, and it seems to be a general point about agency as 
opposed to something special to human-agents. But it doesnÕt engage with the model just 
outlined. Acting on a worldly intention need not involve making anyone elseÕs decisions 
for them.  
 
The self-directed but not non-de se intentions model.  
 
Suppose one sets the worldly intentions model aside and accepts BabbÕs claim that all 
intentions are self-directed. So, for example, JillÕs intention that AyerÕs rock ceases to 
exist is really the intention that she see to it that AyerÕs rock ceases to exist. It doesnÕt 
immediately follow that all intentions are indexical, or de se. Ruth Millikan thinks that 
each of us has a behaviorally special or ÔactiveÕ way of thinking of herself, or Ôself-nameÕ, 
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that leads directly to the performance of intentional actions.2 This is, according to 
Millikan, non-indexical and non-de se. Suppose  Ô@RMÕ is the label for MillikanÕs own 
active way of thinking of herself. One way in which Ô@RMÕ is behaviorally special will be 
that it figures in the intentions that are the direct causes of MillikanÕs actions Ð e.g. 
MillikanÕs intention to go running involves a tokening of the mental sentence Ô@RM 
runsÕ in MillikanÕs intention-box. Moreover, Ô@RMÕ is expressed by Millikan in public 
language using ÔIÕ.  
 
ÔIn making RM's public self references, in purposefully and competently using "I", I 
manifest the activity of my active self name, the name of the person I know how to act.Õ 
(2001: 732).  
One tempting response is to say that an intention that involves Ô@RMÕ is trivially de se 
since it is expressed using ÔIÕ, and being expressible using ÔIÕ just is being de se. 
  
ÔDe seÕ (and ÔindexicalÕ) are just words. One can use them any way one likes. But using 
them in the proposed way threatens to make interesting questions disappear. Millikan 
will say that just as Millikan has Ô@RMÕ, Babb has Ô@BabbÕ. However, Ô@RMÕ and 
Ô@BabbÕ are different. It isnÕt the case that thereÕs a single way of thinking which when 
used by Millikan picks her out and when used by Babb picks Babb out, and it isnÕt true 
that thereÕs any way of thinking that picks Millikan out because she is the person who is 
deploying it. Ô@RMÕ hooks onto Millikan in much the way a proper name does, despite 
the fact that it is expressed in language using ÔIÕ. Is Millikan right about all of this? Or is 
there reason to acknowledge indexicality in thought as well as language? These seem like 
genuine questions. Saying that all it means to say that an intention is Ôde seÕ is that it is 
                                                        
2 See Millikan (1990) and (2001). 
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expressed in public language using the word ÔIÕ threatens to obliterate them (or just 
forces us to find some other way to articulate them). So, we should not use Ôde se self-
directed intentionÕ to just mean Ôa self-directed intention expressible with ÔIÕ (and Babb 
nowhere proposes that we do that). If one thinks that intentions are always de se, then 
one has to give a reason to think that MillikanÕs picture Ð on which intentions are never de 
se Ð is wrong. I note that, on the face of it, MillikanÕs picture does not have any problem 
with the consideration that making someone elseÕs decision for them is impossible. JillÕs 
Ô@JillÕ way of thinking is precisely not a way of thinking of someone other than Jill (e.g. 
Jack). It isnÕt even true that JillÕs Ô@JillÕ-intentions are ones that Ôfor all Jill knows, could 
be about someone elseÕ. If Jill is asked who one of these intentions is about she will say: 
ÔItÕs about meÕ. 
 
Section II: The argument from conflicting intentions 
 
Babb has a second (independent, it seems to me) argument for the claim that intentions 
have to be de se that focuses on how conflicts of intention are resolved. Since I think 
there are different ways in which this argument might be reconstructed, IÕm going to 
quote fairly extensively from the portion of BabbÕs paper in which it appears:  
  
For those like Castaeda the process of deciding what to do, or practical 
reasoning, always takes place within a first-personal, subjective perspective, which 
is Ôpersonal, ephemeral, confrontational, and executiveÕ (1989: 126). The point 
Castaeda is pushing is that there is no such thing as deciding what to do, or 
reasoning, under a third-person, objective perspective, as this would be mere 
computation or calculation, as a non-agential computer would do. We, however, 
are not mere computer. Similarly, Burge argues that Ôfully understanding the 
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concept of reason, and engaging in reasoning in the most reflective and 
articulated way, require having the I concept and being able to apply it for this 
purposeÕ (2000: 259). Though BurgeÕs point is weaker than CastaedaÕs (he is 
only saying that one cannot understand the concept of reason fully unless one can 
conceptualize oneself in a first-person way), it still serves to mark an important 
relation between reason and the first-person.  
 
That we are not mere computers can be drawn out by considering cases of 
conflicting intentions. Suppose that on Monday Jill forms an intention to phone 
her mother at 4 pm on Thursday. Now it is Wednesday and Jill is trying to 
schedule a meeting with her boss to discuss a problem at work. The only time her 
boss is available is 4 pm on Thursday. Not thinking about the intention she 
formed earlier, Jill agrees to meet then and thereby forms an intention to do so. 
Soon afterwards, she realizes her mistake. She now has two intentions that 
cannot both be satisfied. If Jill were a mere computer, this conflict would cause a 
system crash. But this is not what happens. Rather, Jill (qua herself) recognizes 
the conflict and makes an executive decision to abandon one of the intentions 
and keep the other (or abandon both). It is here, in deciding between the 
conflicting intentions, that we see Jill is more than a computer, that decision-
making requires an agent herself to be part of the process (2016:453). 
 
I suspect that invoking the idea of a Ômere computerÕ is not helpful in this context. If a 
mere computer is a computer that is not an intentional agent then, of course, Jill is not a 
mere computer. If a mere computer is an intentional agent whose actions arenÕt always 
explained by de se intentions, then it isnÕt obvious that Jill is not a mere computer. ItÕs hard 
to see what intermediate understanding could help move the dialectic forward.   
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ItÕs clear that Castaeda and Burge, who Babb approvingly cites, think that there is some 
interesting connection between agency and the de se. But Babb also offers an argument, 
which turns on the phenomenon of resolving conflicting intentions, and it is this that I 
am most interested in. The question I want to press is whether someone who accepts 
either of the models of non-de se intention I have outlined couldnÕt give the very same 
answer to the question of how Jill resolves conflicts in her intentions that Babb 
recommends. What stops them from saying that Jill simply recognizes the conflict and as 
a result abandons one or both of the two intentions? 
 
There is no difficulty with the idea that this makes Jill herself part of the decision-making 
process. Everyone ought to, and can, accept that Jill is part of that process.  
 
The non-de se version of the answer wonÕt make any play with the thought that Jill Ô(qua 
herself)Õ recognizes the conflict of intention. That is, it wonÕt if the job Ô(qua herself)Õ 
does is to invoke the de se in some way. But, the question is: why is the answer any the 
worse for that?  
 
The phrase Ô(qua herself)Õ might not be intended to invoke the de se (note that it doesnÕt in 
fact appear within the scope of an attitude verb, which is what makes it a bit hard to 
interpret). It might just be a reminder that Jill herself, the agent, is involved in the 
process. But, again, everyone can accept that.  
 
It does seem true and important that conflicts among different mental states (e.g. 
intentions, but also beliefs) of a single subject make for irrationality in a way that conflicts 
among different mental states of different subjects do not. Moreover, one might think that 
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rational subjects are responsible for monitoring their own mental states and removing 
conflicts. One might further think that for the monitoring to be effective the de se must 
somehow be involved (ÔI intend p, and I also intend not p. Something has to giveÉÕ). 
Might this line of thought provide a route towards BabbÕs conclusion that intentions, and 
therefore intentional actions, always involve the de se?3 
 
It seems not to. First, if the thing that makes for irrationality is conflict among the 
mental states held by a single subject the monitoring of those mental states by the subject 
seems like a means to an end Ð that of removing the conflict. And it isnÕt obvious why 
the conflict could only be removed via that means.  On the face of it, this is something 
that could be taken care of subpersonally, without the intervention of a reviewing 
subject. Suppose that is wrong though, and that the intervention of the reviewing subject 
is essential. It still isnÕt obvious why the intervention Ð the belief about the existence of a 
conflict the subject forms Ð needs to involve the de se. Suppose Jill thinks something that 
she would express would express using the sentence ÔThat first intention of mine conflicts 
with that second intention of mineÕ, and this causes one of her two intentions to be 
abandoned. Someone who likes the non-de se but self-directed model of intentions 
sketched earlier can deny that that recognition involves the de se. The thing that Jill 
realizes, and uses the first-person possessive to express, is non-de se: ÔThat first intention 
of @JillÕs conflicts with that second intention of @JillÕsÕ. Finally, even if the intervention 
does involve the de se it doesnÕt follow that the intentions intervened on need to be de se. 
The belief ÔI believe that climate change is real, and I believe that climate change is not 
realÕ is de se, even though the content of neither first-order belief about climate change is 
de se. Similarly, ÔI intend this thing, and I intend that conflicting thingÕ might be a de se 
intervention. But it doesnÕt follow that intentions the belief is about need to be de se. 
                                                        
3 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for the suggestion that this line of thought be considered.  
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IÕve argued that the claim that avoiding conflicts among oneÕs mental states requires the 
de se is unsupported. But, even if it were true, appealing to it wouldnÕt implement BabbÕs 
strategy of arguing that intentional action requires the de se because all intentions are de se. 
I conclude by giving a reason to be skeptical about BabbÕs intention-centric explanatory 
strategy of essential indexicality that abstracts away from particular attempts to 
implement it.   
 
Conclusion  
 
It isnÕt obvious that intentions arenÕt always de se. There are no clear counterexamples to 
the claim that they are. For any putatively worldly intention (e.g. the intention that AyerÕs 
rock cease to exist), it will be possible to find a self-directed intention that that intention 
might be identified with (e.g. the intention that I see to it that AyerÕs rock cease to exist). 
This self-directed intention will be expressible with ÔIÕ. And there might well turn to be 
reasons to think that, pace Millikan, if a mental state is expressible using ÔIÕ, then it must 
itself be de se. 
 
Suppose then, for the sake of argument, that intentions are always de se Ð intentions, as a 
mental state type, are de se. I would still want to claim that this leaves the most interesting 
questions about essential indexical cases, including essential indexical cases that involve 
intention, open. In clarifying this suggestion, I set out a span of four different essential 
indexical cases:  
 
Case 0: I intend that the Messy Shopper stop making a mess. I donÕt know that I 
am the Messy Shopper. I keep on making a mess.   
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Case 1: I intend to leave for my meeting at 3pm. I donÕt know that it is 3pm now. I 
stay in my office.  
 
Case 2: I am in pain. I introspect. I donÕt know that I am the Messy Shopper. I 
am asked to assign truth-values to two items on a questionnaire Ð ÔI am in painÕ 
and ÔThe Messy Shopper is in painÕ. I say ÔyesÕ to the first, and ÔdonÕt knowÕ to the 
second.  
 
Case 3. I am an unsophisticated and impulsive agent. I never form decisions 
about how to act and then store them up for future control of action. 
Accordingly, the most compelling reason for positing intentions does not apply 
to me. The conative aspect of my psychology is adequately dealt with by desire. I 
desire ÔS eatÕ but not ÔI eatÕ. I do not eat, even though I am S.  
 
In each case, the distinction between an indexical and a non-indexical ways of thinking of 
something seems crucial. In Case 0, Case 1 and Case 3 having an indexical way of thinking 
seems essential if one is to intentionally do something. In Case 2, having an indexical way 
of thinking seems essential to articulate what it is one is a position to know. It is very 
natural to think that the explanation of the four cases will have something in common. 
Relatedly, I would only have confidence in an explanation of what is going on in Case 0 if 
it looked as though the explanation, or some analogue of it, could extend to the other 
three cases. 4 The point that intentions Ð as a mental state type Ð are always de se is not 
                                                        
4 Not everyone will be persuaded by this argument from theoretical unity. I note that, even bracketing it, it 
isnÕt clear that the claim that all intentions are de se helps at all with Case 0. If all intentions are de se, then 
even my (pre-light bulb moment) intention that the Messy Shopper stop making a mess is de se. Such an 
intention wonÕt lead directly to action, whereas my (post-light bulb moment) intention that I stop making a 
mess will lead directly to action. Intuitively, our chief interest in Case 0 is to know why, post-light bulb 
moment, I am in a mental state that can lead directly to action, whereas before I was not. If both intentions 
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going to be the basis of an explanation that extends in this way.  Case 1 involves intention 
and the de nunc. But it isnÕt true that intentions are always de nunc Ð I can intend at 4pm to 
do something at 5pm. Case 2 involves de se belief. But it isnÕt true that belief is always about 
the believer Ð e.g. my belief that 2+2=4 is not about me. Case 3 involves de se desire. But, 
it isnÕt true that desire is always about the desirer. Accordingly, I suspect that the claim 
that all intentions are de se, even if true, must give way to a deeper explanation of what is 
doing on in Case 0, one which captures why it is that it belongs in same theoretical 
natural kind as Cases 1-3.5 
University of Barcelona, Spain  
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